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ABSTRACT. This paper studies greenhouse-gas (GHG) emission controls 
in the presence of carbon leakage through international firm relocation. 
The Kyoto Protocol requires developed countries to reduce GHG 
emissions by a certain amount. Comparing emission quotas with emission 
taxes, we show that taxes coupled with lower trade costs facilitate more 
firm relocationsthan quotas do, causing more international carbon 
leakage. Thus, if a country is concerned about global emissions, emission 
quotas would be adoptedto mitigate the carbon leakage. Firm relocation 
entails a trade-off between trade liberalization and emission regulations. 
Emission regulations may be hampered by trade liberalization, and vice 
versa. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Global environmental problems have recently attracted considerable 
worldwide attention. In particular, global warming caused by greenhouse-gas (GHG) 
emissions has been the central issue among the problems. To cope with global 
warming, an international environmental treaty, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), was made at the Earth Summit held in 
Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Then the Kyoto Protocol was adopted at the third session of 
the Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC (COP3) in December 1997.
1 In the protocol, 
the industrialized countries called Annex I Parties made a commitment to decrease 
their GHG emissions by 5.2% compared to their 1990 baseline levels over the 2008 to 
2012 period. However, the United States, which is a signatory to the protocol, has not 
ratified the protocol. Moreover, developing countries including China and India have 
no obligation to the reduction. 
There is no doubt that the Kyoto Protocol is a significant step towards the 
reduction of GHG emissions. Obviously, however, the partial participation of certain 
countries in the framework of GHG emission reduction is a vital drawback. In 
particular, the United States and China are the largest GHG emitters in the world.
2 
Moreover, with partial participation, a serious concern is international carbon leakage. 
That is, the reduction of GHG emissions in some countries increases those in other 
countries. As a result, worldwide emissions may rise. 
International carbon leakage occurs through a number of channels. For 
example, it may occur through fuel price changes (Ishikawa and Kiyono, 2000; 
Kiyono and Ishikawa, 2004). When a country adopts policies to reduce GHG 
emissions, its demand for fossil fuels is likely to decrease. If their world prices fall as 
a result, the demand for fossil fuels rises in other countries with weak regulations. 
Carbon leakage may also arise through the changes in a country’s industrial structures 
(Copeland and Taylor 2005; Ishikawa and Kiyono, 2006). With stringent GHG 
emission regulations, the comparative advantage of the emission-intensive industry 
may shift abroad. This is the so-called pollution haven hypothesis. In particular, in 
                                                 
1 The Kyoto Protocol came into force in February 2005. 
2 In 2005, the shares of world CO2 emissions were 21.4% for the United States and 18.6% for China, 
respectively.   3
response to environmental policy differences across countries, firms may relocate to 
countries with lax environmental regulations (Markusen et al., 1993, 1995). Recent 
improvements in transportation and communications technology as well as trade 
liberalization allow firms to relocate their plants more easily. 
In this paper, we compare emission taxes with emission quotas (including 
creation of a competitive emission-permit market) in the presence of the possibility of 
firm relocation. Specifically, using a new economic geography (NEG) framework, we 
examine the effects of trade costs on emission taxes and quotas. In our model, there 
are two countries (North and South), two sectors (agriculture and manufacturing), and 
two factors (capital and labour). The agricultural product, which perfectly competitive 
firms produce from labour alone with constant-returns-scale (CRS) technology, is 
freely traded internationally. The manufactured products are subject to the Dixit–
Stiglitz (1977) type of monopolistic competition and are costly to ship internationally. 
Following Martin and Rogers (1995), we assume that only capital is mobile across 
countries and determines plant location.
3 
To make our point as clearly as possible, in the benchmark case North’s 
market is larger than South’s market and all firms in the manufacturing sector are 
located in North in stable equilibrium because of small or intermediate trade costs. 
The North government unilaterally adopts an environmental policy, either an emission 
tax or an emission quota. Then we consider the effects of these policies when trade 
costs fall and firms are free to relocate to South. 
One of our main results is as follows. If North cares only about local 
emissions, then North prefers emission taxes to emission quotas. On the other hand, if 
North is concerned about global emissions, then emission quotas should be adopted. 
This result has interesting implications for the Kyoto Protocol when regarding Annex 
I Parties as North. As mentioned above, the target for GHG emission reductions set by 
Annex I Parties in the protocol is a local one. In the presence of firm relocation from 
Annex I Parties to the other countries, therefore, trade liberalization may induce 
Annex I Parties to adopt emission taxes rather than emission quotas to achieve the 
                                                 
3 This model is known as the footloose capital model, which is the simplest model in NEG. See 
Baldwin et al. (2003).   4
target. From the viewpoint of worldwide emission reduction, however, emission 
quotas are more effective. 
Another main result is that when emission taxes are adopted in North to attain 
a target of global emission reduction, trade costs and tax rates must satisfy certain 
conditions. Intuitively, lower trade costs coupled with tougher regulations facilitate 
firm relocation, which leads to carbon leakage. Thus, free firm relocation entails a 
trade-off between trade liberalization and emission regulations. Emission regulations 
may be hampered by trade liberalization, and vice versa. 
There are many papers that examine the pollution haven hypothesis. In the 
framework of an open economy, the first theoretical analysis on the hypothesis is 
Pethig (1976).
4 Then Markusen et al. (1993, 1995) investigate the hypothesis in the 
presence of foreign direct investment (FDI). In Markusen et al. (1993), two polluting 
firms (one is local and the other is foreign) choose the number of plant and plant 
locations when only the home country adopts emission taxes. They are primarily 
concerned with market structures induced by taxes. In Markusen et al. (1995), a single 
firm decides the plant number and locations when both countries adopt environmental 
policies non-cooperatively. The governments have an incentive to lower (raise) 
environmental standards to attract (deter) investment if the benefit from investment is 
greater (less) than the loss (i.e., the environmental damage).
5 
Firm locations and trade costs are central issues in the NEG literature. A few 
NEG studies investigate environmental policies (Pfluger, 2001; Venables, 2001; 
Elbers and Withagen, 2004).
6 Pfluger (2001) considers Pigouvian emission taxes in a 
                                                 
4 Evidence on the pollution haven hypothesis is mixed. According to Jaffe et al. (1995), differences in 
environmental policy have little or no effect on trade patterns, investment or firm location. However, 
Henderson (1996), Becker and Henderson (2000), Greenstone (2002), and List et al. (2003) find that 
pollution-intensive plants are responding to environmental regulations. Smarzynska and Wei (2004) 
discuss factors that may make the evidence of the hypothesis weak. Levinson and Taylor (2008) point 
out that the pollution haven effects have been underestimated. 
5 When a country adopts too lax environmental policies in order to keep its competitive advantage, its 
strategy is sometimes called “environmental (or ecological) dumping.” On the other hand, when a 
country adopts too stringent environmental policies in order to reduce local pollution, this strategy is 
called “Not in my back yard (NIMBY).” There are a number of studies which, following Markusen et 
al. (1995), analyse environmental dumping and NIMBY. See, for example, Rauscher (1995) and Ulph 
and Valentini (2001). 
6 Venables (2001) studies the impact of tax on equilibrium in a vertical linkage model. In the case of 
energy taxes that are unilaterally introduced in one country, he discusses hysteresis in location but does 
not investigate any environmental policies. Elbers and Withagen (2004) study the impact of an 
emission tax on agglomeration in the presence of labour migration.   5
NEG model similar to ours. However, his analysis is along the line of Markusen et al. 
(1995). Thus, environmental damages are local and governments can detect emitters, 
estimate the damage and can impose optimal emission taxes. In contrast, emissions in 
our model are global and hence it is hard to identify polluters and estimate emissions 
damage. This makes it impossible to levy a tax on each polluter and compensate the 
public through tax reimbursement. In our paper, global warming is an impending 
issue and each country is required to reduce total emissions by a certain amount. 
A key mechanism of environmental policies is agglomeration rent, which is 
discussed somewhat similarly in the literature of tax competition. The NEG literature 
has been exploring taxation on agglomeration rent (Kind et al., 1998; Ludema and 
Wooton, 2000; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004). However, our environmental policies 
are substantially different from corporate tax competition and agglomeration rent in 
spirit and purpose: 1) A reduction of emissions is an obligation in international 
agreements. Taxation is aimed at reducing emissions to a certain level rather than 
affecting tax revenue. On the other hand, corporate taxation is intended to absorb 
agglomeration rent and raise tax revenue; 2) Tax competition is not plausible in our 
paper. Only developed countries ratify the international agreements and thus taxation 
is unilateral in our North–South model. The environmental policies are mandatory 
across ratified countries so as to reduce emissions to satisfy the agreements. Thus, the 
international environmental agreements leave no room for tax competition to increase 
government revenue, i.e., a race-to-top or race-to-bottom in the tax rate; and 3) Our 
discussion involves how to reduce global emissions while refraining from using a 
pollution haven under trade liberalization. In contrast, tax competition studies show 
how each government seeks to maximize tax revenue by attracting more firms and 
widening the tax base. 
Turning to the environment and trade literature, Ishikawa and Kiyono (2006) 
analyse the potential effects of choices over emission controls in an open economy. 
They specifically compare emission taxes, quotas and standards in a perfectly 
competitive general equilibrium trade model. Their analysis is somewhat similar to 
ours in the sense that one of two countries unilaterally imposes environmental policies,   6
which generates cross-border carbon leakage,
7 and that North’s emission level is 
endogenously determined under emission taxes. However, their model is based on 
traditional trade models (i.e., both Ricardian and Heckscher–Ohlin models) and does 
not take firm relocation into account. 
In an analysis of global warming, Copeland and Taylor (2005) explore the 
relationship between international trade in goods and emission permits using a 
Heckscher–Ohlin framework. They also consider partial participation in the Kyoto 
protocol. Interestingly, they show that unilateral emission reductions in North can 
induce the unconstrained South to reduce emissions. This implies that, in contrast 
with our analysis, international carbon leakage may not be a serious issue even 
without universal participation in the protocol. This contrast basically stems from the 
presence of an income effect as well as the absence of firm relocation in their analysis. 
Here the income effect means that higher income reduces pollution.
8 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our 
basic model. Emission taxes and quotas are investigated in Sections 3 and 4, 
respectively. Then, in Section 5, we compare emission taxes with emission quotas. In 
Section 6, we explore the relationship between emission regulations and trade 
liberalization. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. BASIC MODEL 
2.1.  Two-country, 2-sector, 2-factor model without environmental policies 
We basically introduce GHG emissions into the footloose capital (FC) model 
developed by Martin and Rogers (1995). There are two countries (North and South), 
two production factors (labour, L, and physical capital, K) and two sectors 
(agriculture, A-sector, and manufacturing, M-sector). North is bigger than South in 
population size. The agricultural product is produced from labour alone by perfectly 
competitive firms under CRS technology and is traded without any trade cost. This 
product serves as a numéraire. The manufactured goods are subject to the Dixit–
                                                 
7 Kiyono and Ishikawa (2004) focus on international interdependence of environmental management 
policies in the presence of international carbon leakage. 
8 Evidence of the income effect is also mixed. See, for example, Barbier (1997).   7
Stiglitz type of monopolistic competition and are traded with trade costs. Firms in M-
sector in Martin and Rogers (1995) can move between countries, but there is no entry 
and exit. M-sector uses labour, a variable cost, and exclusively employs capital, a 
fixed cost. Specifically, each firm is required to use one unit of capital, which 
represents fixed costs, and “a” units of labour. The cost function for firm j is given by 
j j awx TC + = π , where π, i.e., the fixed cost part of total cost, represents capital 
return. M-sector emits GHGs in the process of production. Specifically, the 
production of one unit of an M commodity entails one unit of GHG emissions. Trade 




This implies that free trade, τ = 1, can be expressed as П= 1 whereas П= 0 represents 
autarchy (τ = ∞). 
Turning to the demand side, a representative consumer has the following 
quasi-linear utility function: 
(1) 
( ) 1 , 0 1 , ), ( ln
) /( 1 / 1 1 * * / 1 1 > > > + ≡ + − + =
− − σ µ χ χ µ
σ σ σ 1/ - 1
S N c n nc   M f A M U , 
where M and A stand for consumption of M-sector varieties and that of A-sector, 
respectively, and µ is the intensity of preference towards M-sector goods. n and n* are 
the number of differentiated varieties, and c and c* are the quantities of consumption 
for each variety. σ in the CES function for differentiated varieties denotes the constant 
elasticity of substitution between two varieties.
9 The disutility is expressed as an 
increasingly monotonic function of GHG emissions, f( S N χ χ + ), where  N χ and  S χ  
are GHG emissions in North and South, respectively. Each consumer has one unit of 
capital as well as one unit of labour and gets income from both factors, w + π . 
However, the quasi-linear utility function has no income effect and thus each 
consumer buys a certain number of units of M-goods regardless of his/her income and 
M-goods prices. 
Labour is mobile between sectors but immobile between countries. While 
capital is mobile between two nations, capital owners are immobile and thus capital 
                                                 
9 The equilibrium path in the FC model with a quasi-linear utility function is identical to that of the 
Cobb–Douglas utility function. The quasi-linear function eliminates the income effect (See Baldwin, et 
al. 2003).    8
rewards are repatriated to the country of origin. Because capital endowment is 
initially allocated in proportion to labour endowment (market size), North’s share of 
initial capital and labour endowments are given by sK = 
W K K / =  s L = 
W L L/.  
However, after the firm has relocated, capital share is generally not equal to 
population share, whereas population share always corresponds to labour share, sL, 
and capital share is always identical to firm share, 
W N n/  = sK. This is because each 
footloose firm needs one unit of capital. Because no income effect exists, the quasi-
linear utility function ensures s ≡sE = sL, where North’s expenditure share is defined 
as sE = 
W E E / . For simplicity, total expenditure 
W E  and total labour and capital 
endowments, 
W L  and 
W K  (thusthe total number of firms, 
W N ), are normalized to 
one. Thus, n is North’s share of firms.
10 
2.2.  Initial equilibrium 
Because the A-sector good is the numéraire and is freely traded internationally, 
wage rates in both countries are normalized to one, w = w* = 1. Utility maximization 
results in the well-known CES demand function. As a result of maximization, local 

















where “a” is unit labour requirement, equal to marginal cost, which is exogenously 
given as a constant. Consumption per variety is: 
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10 Importantly, we use a quasi-linear utility function. The income effect is eliminated. The total number 
of households (population) is one in the world, because each individual has one unit of labour and 
capital.The level of demand depends on population size rather than income.   9
where E (E*) represents the North’s (South’s) expenditure, and ∆ and ∆* are defined 
as 
σ σ φ
− − − + = ∆
1 1 ) 1 ( ] [ a n na n  and 
σ σ φ
− − − + = ∆
1 1 * ) 1 ( ] [ a n na n .
11
Because our model has asymmetric market size, E(= s) > E*(= 1 – s), i.e., s > 
0.5, pure profit of a North-based firm is higher than that of a South-based firm with 
positive trade costs. Therefore, allowing for free relocation, the pure profits are 
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As trade costs fall (a rise in П), n increases: more South firms go to North, so-called 
gradual agglomeration. Then, below a certain trade cost, called the sustain point (П= 
(1 – s)/s ), all firms concentrate in North, i.e., full agglomeration. That is, trade costs 
above the sustain point (small trade costs) create full agglomeration in the big country 
as a stable equilibrium. For simplicity, we first consider full agglomeration before 
considering any environmental policy. Accordingly, trade costs discussed in our paper 
are assumed to be from the sustain point through free trade: (1 – s)/s <П< 1. 
2.3.  Production and GHG emissions 








1 * * 1 p n np
p
x j , which is identical to c. Turning to the export market, 
only x/Нunits arrive for export because of iceberg trade costs. While North’s 
consumption is equal to the quantity produced in North for each variety, i.e.,  j j c x = , 
                                                 























n . Note that each firm’s 
profit is 1/σ times firm revenue. The (1 – 1/σ) terms cancel out in the price of a variety and in CES 
composition. 
   10












c x j j . It 
follows that the total quantity produced by a North-based firm, firm j, is written as: 
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For simplicity, we assume that producing one unit of goods entails one unit of 
GHG emissions. Thus, the amount of local emissions in each country corresponds to 
each country’s total quantity produced. Local emission levels in North and South are, 
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µ
−
≡ b  is exogenously given and constant. Without loss of generality, 
by an appropriate choice of units we can normalize  1 = b . Note that GHG emissions 
in North and South correspond to quantities produced in each country. In sum, world 
emissions are





























. Utilising these 
specifications, emissions at the initial no-policy equilibrium (full agglomeration in 









χ χ  because of 
σ − = ∆
1 a  and  ∆ = ∆ φ
* . 
Note that GHGs are initially emitted only in North because of North’s full 
agglomeration and the emissions remain constant and are independent of trade costs.
12 
Proposition 1: The total amount of emissions is unaffected by trade costs at 
full agglomeration (no environmental policy) equilibrium. 
                                                 
12 More generally, ignoring a stable equilibrium path, if all firms hypothetically concentrate in one 
country, either North or South, the amount of emissions can be kept constant. For instance, if all firms 























= = + ≡
− − σ σ φ χ χ χ χ , which is the same level as with North’s 
full agglomeration. Hence, the global level of emissions is independent of location in the case of full 
agglomeration, irrespective of a stable equilibrium path.   11
 
3. EMISSION TAX 
3.1.  Taxation without relocation 
Now we introduce environmental policies. Because of international 
environmental agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol, an industrialized country, 
which has manufacturing agglomeration, namely North, is required to limit emissions 
to a certain fixed level. To satisfy the upper bound of emissions, we assume that 
North introduces either an emission tax or quota. In this section, we examine an 
emission tax. 
Starting from full agglomeration, North imposes an emission tax so as to 
reduce emissions and implement the international agreement. At this moment, 
relocation is prohibited (infinitive relocation costs). Because one unit of GHG 
emissions corresponds to one unit of quantity produced in our model, an emission tax 
needs to be levied on each unit of production rather than prices, pure profits or sales. 
Thus, the emission tax is equivalent to a specific production tax, t. Then the total costs 
and prices are expressed as: 
j j x t a TC ) ( + + = π and 
σ
τ















The tax increases total costs and prices.
13 Thus, pure profit of a North-based firm and 
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*
σ φ
χ χ , 
where North’s full agglomeration leads to 
σ − = ∆
1 a and 
σ φ
− = ∆
1 * a . Note that 
taxation without relocation, i.e., without carbon leakage, results in reducing emissions 
from 1/a to 1/(a + t). 
 
                                                 
13 Note that we assume a + t < 1.   12
3.2.  Equilibrium with free relocation 
Next, we allow for free firm relocation. Because taxation decreases profits in 
North, firms may have an incentive to move to the non-taxed country, i.e., South, 
regardless of a small market size. When tax rates are set at a substantial level such 










1 , full agglomeration is not stable any more and 
some firms relocate to South. Firm share, n, is determined so as to equalize pure 










































− − + − + = ∆
1 1 ) ( ) 1 ( t a n na  and 
σ σ φ
− − + − + = ∆
1 1 * ) )( 1 ( t a n a n . 
Figure 1 plots firm share, n, in terms of freeness of trade П, Given a fixed low 
rate of tax, the firm share locus is hump-shaped. Taxation causes international carbon 
leakage: firm relocation occurs from North (taxed country) to South (non-taxed 
country). Stated differently, it is necessary to have intermediate levels of trade costs to 
keep full agglomeration,  NU NL φ φ φ < < , which can be written as: 
(8) 
s a
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In reverse, given a fixed П, a low tax can sustain full agglomeration. The condition 
for the low tax rate is given as: 
a s s a t a s s t a − − < ⇔ > − − +
− − − )) 1 ( 2 /( 1 ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( 2 )) 1 ( 4 ( ~ 0 ) 1 ( 4 ) ~ (
σ σ σ . When the tax rate is 
above t ~ , North never sustains full agglomeration for any trade cost and instead South 
is more likely to achieve full agglomeration. Figure 2 illustrates the case of high tax 
rates without North’s full agglomeration. 
   13
<Figure 2> 
 
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, all firms relocate to South with a sufficiently 
small trade cost, i.e., perfect carbon leakage. The critical value of trade costs,  S φ , is 
analytically given by: 
(10) 
) 1 ( 2
) )( 1 ( 4
1
) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( 2 1
s a
t a s s a a
S −






As the tax rate, t, rises, the critical value, S φ , decreases and full agglomeration in 
South is more likely to occur. A sufficiently small trade cost coupled with a high tax 
rate accelerates international carbon leakage, relocating to the country without 
environmental regulation. Note that  S φ  >  NU φ  >  NL φ  is always ensured.  S φ is a real 
number, because  0 ) )( 1 ( 4
) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( 2 > + − −
− − σ σ t a s s a . We can also verify that  S φ  is 
always larger than  NU φ .
14 
Proposition 2: An emission tax may lead to international carbon leakage. 
Full agglomeration in North (taxed country) can be sustained if the tax rate 
is low and/or trade costs are intermediate. However, when the tax rate is 
high and/or trade costs are sufficiently small, all North firms move to South 
(non-taxed country). 
Note that the standard FC model (without any taxation) has hump-shaped 
agglomeration rents, which is a net benefit from agglomeration (see Baldwin and 
Krugman, 2004): when trade costs decrease, the rents first rise and then fall. Free 
trade has no agglomeration rents. Taxation on the rents reduces the net benefit from 
agglomeration. Thus, large or small trade costs lead to a negative net agglomeration 
benefit, which causes firm relocation to South. 
Turning to emission levels, Figures 3 and 4 plot them for North, South and the 
world, which are given by: 
                                                 
14 This is because 4(1 – s)s < 1 for s > 0.5 and 
) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( 2 ) (
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Allowing firm relocation entails more GHG emissions than the target of the 
international agreements, 1/(a + t), because of international carbon leakage when 
trade costs are either large or small. That is, when trade costs are either large or small, 
North’s emissions fall and South’s emissions rise (Figure 3). The carbon leakage 
decreases North’s emissions, which are less than the target, 1/(a + t), and South’s 



















−σ φ χ χ , where 
* ∆ = ∆ φ  and n* = 1. 
Note that South’s emissions exceed North’s for certain levels of П. As trade costs fall, 








 holds, the South’s emissions 
exceed the North’s.Lower tax rates lead to a critical n of 0.5, and higher tax rates 
increase the critical n. This means that lowering tax rates can moderate carbon 
leakage. 
Figure 4 shows global emissions, which are the sum of North’s and South’s 
emissions. Because small and large trade costs allow more relocation to the non-taxed 
country, global emissions increase. In particular, above  S φ  all firms concentrate in 
South and no firms pay tax, and thus the emission level becomes 1/a. Note that this is   15
identical to the initial no-policy level. North’s emission policy is nullified and the 
global amount of emissions returns to the initial equilibrium (no environmental 
policy). We can say that the only impact of taxation with small trade costs is to 
transfer GHG emissions from North to South through the relocation of all firms. With 
small trade costs, unilateral emission taxation results in perfect carbon leakage (full 
agglomeration in South) and taxation cannot control pollution any more. 
Proposition 3: With emission taxation, the global emission level is generally 
U-shaped in terms of freeness of trade. Emission taxation has no impact on 
the global emission level when trade costs are sufficiently small. 
 
4. EMISSION QUOTA 
4.1.  Quota without relocation 
Now we discuss the other policy, an emission quota. In this case, starting from 
full agglomeration, North unilaterally introduces an emission quota so as to satisfy 
international environmental agreements. To make a strict comparison of policy impact 
on carbon leakage in the tax case, the quota is set so that the emission level under the 





χ (constant). Moreover, the quota is assumed to be 
accompanied by creation of a competitive emission-permit market in North. The 
quota is implemented by the North government via a fee. Purchasing one unit of the 
permit allows one unit of production for a North firm. Using (6), the level of the quota 
is given by: 
(11) 





























σ σ χ . 
Thus, the price of emission permit q is equal to t at full agglomeration (initial 
equilibrium), i.e., q  = t. 
The following should be noted. The price of permit, q, is endogenously 
determined by the number of firms located in North and trade costs so as to satisfy 
North’s emission-permit market clearance,  0 ) (
) 1 (
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s s
n ,   16
although tax rates are invariant, exogenously given by international agreements. 
(
σ σ φ
− − + − + = ∆
1 1 ) ( ) 1 ( q a n na  and 
σ σ φ
− − + − + = ∆
1 1 * ) )( 1 ( q a n a n ). 
This results in different impacts on firm location and emission level. Total 
costs and price are written as  j j x q a TC ) ( + + =π , 














Firm location is determined by profit equalization and the size of the quota. 
 
4.2.  Equilibriumwith free relocation 
At the equilibrium, n and q are determined by pure profit equalization as well 
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Figure 5 plots firm share, n, in terms of freeness of trade, П. Similarly to taxation, 
small or large trade costs lead to firm relocation and international carbon leakage, 




Because we assume that the emission level under a quota is the same as that 
under taxation with full agglomeration, q  = t and trade costs that result in full 
agglomeration are fully equivalent to those under taxation: 
                                                 
15 In our model, the quota is always binding and has a positive permit price. If q is negative or zero, 
then no firms have an incentive to relocate and full agglomeration is achieved. In addition, the total 
emission level is reduced by international regulation and thus the number of permits supplied by the 
government is less than the quantities produced with full agglomeration. It follows that q should be 
positive.   17
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. 
However, unlike the effect of an emission tax, a quota does not involve South’s full 
agglomeration with small trade costs. Some firms stay in North at any trade cost. As 
plotted in Figure 6, q is positive for  1 0 < ≤φ  and hump-shaped. As long as all firms 
are in North (full agglomeration) with intermediate trade costs, quota prices equal the 
values of t (= q ). However, when agglomeration rents fall because of small trade 
costs, firm relocation to South reduces q, while taxation t remains constant. Firm 
relocation to South softens the quota constraint in North. The fall of the permit price 




Proposition 4: With an emission quota, full agglomeration in North can be 
sustained with intermediate trade costs. However, full agglomeration never 
occurs in South for any positive quota level. 
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Figures 7 and 8 plot emissions in terms of trade costs. Similarly to the tax case, a 
quota leads to U-shaped global emissions in terms of trade costs. More generally, in 
the case of small/large trade costs, some firms relocate and emit GHGs in South, 
although North’s emissions are kept at 1/(a + t) because of the emission constraint. 
However, unlike the effect from taxation, global emissions never return to the no-  18
policy level, 1/a, for any positive trade costs. Because South never creates full 
agglomeration and the quota is still binding in North, this diversification of firm 







Proposition 5: In the case of an emission quota, North’s GHG emissions are 
always kept at the target level of international environmental agreements, 
although South increases emissions via international carbon leakage under 
trade liberalization. 
 
5. EMISSION TAX VERSUS QUOTA 
Here, we make a comparison with two-policy effects on emissions. The only 
target of the North government is to implement the international environmental 
agreement and reduce North’s local GHG emissions. 
The first finding is related to tax rates and the quota price. Because 
international agreements allocate a certain amount of GHG emissions to North,χ, tax 
rates and the price for the permit in the quota system are all equal (t = q ) as long as 
all firms concentrate in North. For this reason, both policies have the same full 
agglomeration range: the same levels of  NL φ and  NU φ . This implies that firm 
relocation begins at the same critical trade costs. However, relocation to South caused 
by environmental regulations results in q being less than t for a givenП(i.e., t > q) 
(see Appendix for an analytical derivation). The tax rate is fixed, but the fee for the 
emission permit is endogenously determined by the number of North firms. As more 
firms relocate to South, the emission constraint can be more easily attained and then 
the permit price decreases. Furthermore, when many firms move to South, the permit 
price drastically decreases, which hampers firm relocation. To summarize:   19
Proposition 6: The price of the emission permit under a quota is always 
lower than the per unit emission tax rate in the presence of relocation. 
In other words, we can say that the quota has a weaker relocation effect than 
tax. As is clear in Figure 9, carbon leakage is moderate under the quota. Because tax 
has a stronger relocation effect, it always leads to more carbon leakage and full 




Turning to global emissions, this implies that the emission in North is larger 




Proposition 7: The GHG emission level in North is higher with quota than 
with taxpolicy in the presence of relocation. Compared with taxation, a 
quota can mitigate international carbon leakage. 
This suggests that if North seeks to reduce only the local emissions to satisfy 
the international environmental agreements, North prefers taxation to a quota with 
small trade costs. While a quota keeps some firms in North, taxation with trade 
liberalization can force all firms to South and thus North has no firms to emit GHGs, 
perfectly satisfying international agreements. Then, North will import manufactured 
goods from the fully agglomerated South with small trade costs.
16 Accordingly, North 
will take taxation with pro-trade liberalization. 
However, from a global viewpoint such an egoistic attitude by North may not 
be acceptable. Regarding global emissions, as long as firms are allowed to relocate 
                                                 
16 Note that South still has agriculture. Because our model adopts a quasi-linear utility function to 
exclude any income effect and we assume that each consumer holds capital and labour, the expenditure 
on M-goods is not so high as to induce complete specialization in M-sector in the South.   20
freely, international carbon leakage could be larger than the reduction in GHGs in 
North. In particular, tax policy returns to the pre-agreement global emission level. For 
this reason, with free relocation and small trade costs because of trade liberalization, a 
quota is a better policy scheme for reducing global emissions. A quota has a weaker 
impact on firm relocation. The quota system could be more effective and make the 
emission level closer to the global target, although not only tax but also the quota 
results in more global emissions than the target as long as some firms locate in South 
and trade liberalization proceeds. 
Proposition 8: An emission quota is a better policy scheme than an emission 
tax in the sense of it being a more stringent constraint on global emissions 
under free relocation with small trade costs. 
 
6. GLOBAL EMISSIONS, 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS AND 
TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
Free relocation with small trade costs mitigates the effect of environmental 
policy and consequently the global level of emissions is higher than the level 
determined by international agreements. Now, we study what sorts of policies and 
agreements can properly control global GHG emissions as expected by international 
agreements while accommodating international free relocation. One solution may be 
to choose the combination of environmental tax rates as well as trade costs by 
international agreement. 
Here, we keep the situation where only North ratifies international 
environmental agreements. The policy stems from the outcomes so far. Given the 
international environmental agreement on total emissions χ  = 1/(a + t), it is 
necessary to prevent firm relocation and keep full agglomeration in North. To do so, 
tax rates and trade costs should be in the shaded area in Figure 11: intermediate trade 
costs and low tax rate. 
 
<Figure 11> 
   21
When any combination of both the tax rate and trade costs in the shaded area 
is set up by international agreements and international organizations, the target level 
of global emissions in international environmental agreements can be achieved. To 
summarize: 
Proposition 9: When only North ratifies environmental agreements, it 
needs to keep intermediate trade costs and levy a small environmental tax 
to prevent international carbon leakage and achieve the target level of 
global emissions in international agreements. 
This result yields an important insight that, when the environmental 
agreements are ratified only by North, the degree of North’s environmental policy 
may be restricted by trade liberalization and vice versa. Free firm relocation entails a 
trade-off between trade liberalization and environmental regulation. 
Next, as another possibility, we consider the situation where both countries 
ratify the international environmental agreements. If South ratifies an international 
environmental agreement, things would be much easier. When global warming 
becomes serious, South may have an incentive to ratify agreements so as to prevent 
firm relocation from North. When the emission tax rates are the same across countries, 
firms prefer to stay in the bigger market, North, and no firms locate to South. 
Therefore, in this case the target level of global emissions can be achieved for any 
trade cost:  χ  = 1/(a + t). It is necessary that international agreements specify the 
target level of emissions as well as the internationally levied tax rate. The common 
tax rate is the key to the implementation. In this case, trade liberalization is not 
hampered by environmental policy, because there is no international carbon leakage. 
If both countries ratify the agreement, global GHG emissions could be reduced 
below the target, χ<  χ  = 1/(a + t). In addition to the given global target,  χ  1/(a 
+ t), international agreements state that tax rate, t, is a lower bound and allows for a 
higher tax rate on the condition that full agglomeration can be kept in North.
17 When 
                                                 
17 If North imposes a sufficiently high rate of environmental tax, firms relocate to South (lax 
environment country) and emission increases because of the emission haven effect as discussed in 
previous sections. Here, we assume that a marginal tax rate is allowed so as to promote the reduction of 
local emissions but to prevent an emission haven.   22
North suffers large damage from global warming, North will have an incentive to set 
a tax rate higher than t by υ (i.e., υ + t). This tax rate is defined by: 
(199)  ) ( 1
1 ) )( 1 (
) (
) 1 /( 1 2 1 2
1 t a





























When freeness of trade is (1 – s)/s or 1, the additional tax rate υ is zero. Otherwise, υ 
is strictly positive. υ is hump-shaped with respect to freeness of trade. As shown in 
Figure 12, North’s (equivalently global) emission level is U-shaped. With positive 




Proposition 10: If international agreements voluntarily impose a more stringent 
(local) emission tax and if environmental damage in North is large, North has an 
incentive to set higher tax rates, which could make GHG emissions lower than 




This paper studied the impact of environmental policies on firm location and 
carbon leakage when international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol require the 
ratified countries to reduce emissions by a certain amount. We have compared two 
environmental policy tools, emission tax and quota, under trade liberalization. 
We have found the following. 1) When trade costs are small, either 
environmental policy leads firms to relocate to a country without any environmental 
regulation, which causes international carbon leakage. Thus, either environmental 
policy causes carbon leakage with free trade and free relocations. 2) An emission tax 
results in more firm relocation than a quota. Thus, an emission tax causes more 
carbon leakage, increasing global emissions. If North is concerned with only local 
emissions, a tax is adopted to attain the reduction target. On the other hand, if North is 
concerned with global emissions, a quota is preferred. Thus, a quota is a better policy   23
tool to cope with global warming. 3) Trade liberalization and environmental policies 
are a trade-off when environmental agreements are unilateral. Trade liberalization 
may hamper international environmental agreements. Under certain combinations of 
tax rates and trade costs, a target reduction in global GHG emissions can be attained. 
Our paper is the first step in exploring the relationship between trade 
liberalization and environmental policies in the presence of firm relocation. This 
paper has some limitations. For example, the policy target in this paper is to reduce 
GHG emissions to highlight the different policy effects of a tax and a quota. Of course, 
it is plausible to think that governments maximize social welfare. Welfare analysis 
and socially optimal policies are a subject for future research. Because our model 
assumes one unit of emission per unit of quantity produced, production and emissions 
are subject to a perfect trade-off: more production (consumption) positively affects 
welfare but simultaneously has a negative effect through increased emissions. There 
might exist an optimal level of emissions and production, which hinges on the 
specification of a social welfare function. To conduct welfare analysis formally, we 
have to specify disutility in the utility function more rigorously, taking into account 
trans-boundary/local emissions and accumulation of emissions over time.
Furthermore, it might be worthwhile considering the negative impact of emissions on 
A-sector productivity. A-sector might be subject to decreasing returns to scale by 
serious emissions. Future research should conduct a more rigorous analysis on the 
international environmental agreements and negotiation in Section 6 by using game 
theory. 
Moreover, we have assumed a quasi-linear utility function that excludes an 
income effect. The total demand for manufactured goods remains constanteven if 
firms relocate and prices change through the absence of taxation or a quota in South. 
The constant total demand implies constant total production and hence the global 
emission level without any environmental policy is independent of trade costs. This 
has the advantage of highlighting the different effects of the two policies. We can get 
analytical solutions allowing us to easily compare the relocation effects of a tax and a 
quota. Furthermore, even if we take into account tax/quota revenue reimbursement,   24
because we can ignore its impact, we can focus on the effects of each policy scheme 




APPENDIX: QUOTA PRICE AND TAX RATE 
Here, we mathematically show the relationship between tax and quota policies 
using analytical solutions. North’s emissions without relocation, which are the target 
of international agreements, are denoted as: 
(A1) 
σ φ χ
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1 ) ( t a  and  ∆ = ∆ φ
*
. As mentioned in the main text, this target level of 
emissions always corresponds to that of the quota case, regardless of 
relocation:









χ χ . Note that at an initial equilibrium (full 
agglomeration without allowing for relocation), q is equal to t ( t q = ). 





















wheretax rate t is fixed. We compare (A1) and (A2): 
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18 However, it is certainly worthwhile examining the robustness of our results in the presence of an 
income effect. The presence of an income effect caused by relocation may cause a complete 
specialization in manufacturing (agriculture) in South (North), though it is an extreme and unrealistic 
case. Agriculture is not the numéraire any more and factor prices are determined by the trade balance 
and factor markets. In this case, market size and factor prices may determine emission levels.   25





N χ χ ≥ . 
Turning to q, because North’s emissions are always identical to the target in 
the international agreements, by keeping a constant emission level through adjusting 
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. Therefore, we show that an endogenously determined quota price is 
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